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homas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions1 
presents a radical account of the process of scientific 
change, and of the nature of science itself.  The Scien-
tific Revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries serves as the model of what Kuhn meant as a 
proper scientific revolution, and Kuhn focuses primarily on the 
Copernican Revolution to illustrate this point.  However, this 
paper intends to illustrate one other transition within this period 
that also supports Kuhn’s theory – namely, the transition be-
tween the natural philosophies of the Cartesians and the Newto-
nians.  In particular, I would like to show how a number of con-
cepts fundamental to each program are indicative of Kuhn’s no-
tion of incommensurability between two competing paradigms, 
which serve to prevent an intelligible link between both worlds.  
 Kuhn begins his approach to the history and philosophy of 
science by rejecting the commonly held view of science as con-
tinually progressing, that each scientific theory builds upon pre-
ceding theories, edging always closer to the truth.  Kuhn sees this 
as far too simplistic an account of the history of science, and ar-
gues that there are radical and incommensurable discontinuities 
between different episodes of scientific investigation which make 
the idea of continuous progress untenable.   
Kuhn sees the history of science as punctuated by radical in-
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tellectual revolutions that serve to overturn lengthy periods of 
mere puzzle-solving.  These periods of puzzle-solving are char-
acterized less by independent and objective research than by ad-
herence to prescribed assumptions and expected outcomes.  Dur-
ing these periods of so-called “normal science,” curious or unex-
pected findings are brushed aside as irrelevant, since they do not 
serve to confirm or support the current system of scientific the-
ory.  Therefore, research that serves to challenge current assump-
tions is most often viciously attacked and debunked or ignored 
to the point of marginalization. 
Kuhn refers to this system of dominant beliefs and assump-
tions as a paradigm.  Paradigms “provide scientists not only with 
a map but also with some of the directions essential for map-
making.  In learning a paradigm the scientist acquires theory, 
methods, and standards together, usually in an inextricable mix-
ture.”2 According to Kuhn, only results which tend to strengthen 
the current paradigm are accepted during periods of normal sci-
ence.  The paradigm itself is never criticized directly or chal-
lenged properly: 
 
Closely examined, whether historically or in the 
contemporary laboratory, that enterprise seems 
an attempt to force nature into the preformed 
and relatively inflexible box that the paradigm 
supplies.  No part of the aim of normal science is 
to call forth new theories, and they are often in-
tolerant of those invented by others.  Instead, 
normal-scientific research is directed to the ar-
ticulation of those phenomena and theories that 
the paradigm already supplies.3 
 
However, Kuhn claims that when a paradigm fails to provide 
adequate explanatory force for observed phenomena, or a new, 
more powerful model has greater explanatory power, the para-
digm reaches a crisis and is eventually overthrown by intellectual 
revolutions.  Thus, there is a “paradigm-shift,” in which a new 
paradigm literally takes the place of an old one.  Kuhn writes: 
Stephen Trochimchuk 42 
Episteme_Vol19 
page 42
 
Composite
Monday, April 28, 2008 16:28
 
the transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new 
one from which a new tradition of normal sci-
ence can emerge is far from a cumulative proc-
ess one achieved by an articulation or extension 
of the old paradigm.  Rather it is a reconstruc-
tion of the field from new fundamentals, a re-
construction that changes some of the field’s 
most elementary theoretical generalization as 
well as many of its paradigm methods and ap-
plications.  During the transition period there 
will be a large but never complete overlap be-
tween the problems that can be solves by the old 
and the new paradigm.  But there will also be a 
decisive difference in the modes of solution.4 
 
As Kuhn illustrates, the Copernican Revolution is the quintessen-
tial paradigm shift: where an entirely new, heliocentric world-
view replaced the old, Ptolemaic idea that the sun revolves 
around the earth.  During the period of the Ptolemaic paradigm, 
scientists based their findings and interpretations upon the as-
sumptions and predispositions provided by the Ptolemaic sys-
tem of beliefs.  Only when Copernicus – with the help of Galileo 
– turned these beliefs on their heads could there be a proper 
paradigm-shift.  
Kuhn claims that paradigm shifts are similar to a religious 
awakening or conversion, in that one paradigm replaces another 
“not by deliberation and interpretation, but by a relatively sud-
den and unstructured event like the gestalt switch.  Scientists 
then often speak of the ‘scales falling from the eyes’ or of the 
‘lightning flash’ that ‘inundates’ a previously obscure puzzle, 
enabling its components to be seen in a new way that for the first 
time permits its solution.”5 Furthermore, “once a paradigm 
through which to view nature has been found, there is no such 
thing as research in the absence of any paradigm.  To reject one 
paradigm without simultaneously substituting another is to re-
ject science itself.  That act reflects not on the paradigm, but on 
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the man.  Inevitably he will be seen by his colleagues as ‘the car-
penter who blames his tools.’”6 
An essential aspect of Kuhn’s theory is the notion of incom-
mensurability, which serves to defy the notion that science pro-
gresses necessarily towards some ultimate truth.  For Kuhn, the 
rejection of a previous paradigm in favor of a completely new 
one rules out the possibility of comparison.  This explains the 
problem that arises when two competing theories vie for the 
minds of the scientific community, that there is a certain break-
down of rational argument and communication between adher-
ents of competing programs.  Kuhn argues that this is because 
scientists working within different historical periods and differ-
ent paradigms live in psychologically different worlds.  As Kuhn 
points out, “After Copernicus, astronomers lived in a different 
world.”7  He means that when Ptolemy observes the sun, he ob-
serves an object that moves around the earth, whereas Coperni-
cus sees the central star of the solar system – their viewpoints are 
fundamentally incommensurable, in that the word “sun” means 
something entirely different within each paradigm.  Supporters 
of either the Ptolemaic or heliocentric theories simply cannot ar-
gue in rational terms, since they are unable to argue about the 
same thing – they each speak a different language with a different 
conceptual vocabulary: 
 
the Copernicans who denied its traditional title 
‘planet’ to the sun were not only learning what 
‘planet’ meant or what the sun was.  Instead, 
they were changing the meaning of ‘planet’ so 
that it could continue to make useful distinc-
tions in a world where all celestial bodies, not 
just the sun, were seen differently from the way 
they had been seen before.8 
 
Therefore, for Kuhn, there exist deep conceptual gaps between 
competing paradigms in science.  Despite the fact that a scientist 
can learn a new lexicon and become “bilingual” between two 
competing paradigms, there is still no way of direct translation 
Stephen Trochimchuk 44 
Episteme_Vol19 
page 44
 
Composite
Monday, April 28, 2008 16:28
between them.  As a consequence, one often has to use non-
rational means of persuasion in order to convince an adherent of 
one paradigm to adopt another.9 
For Descartes’ mechanical philosophy, “everything in nature 
is to be explained in terms of the size, shape, and motion of the 
small parts that make up a sensible body.”10  Indeed, Descartes 
would grant no other properties to matter than extension and 
motion, and he essentially reduces all mechanics and physics to a 
geometry of motions.  In essence, Descartes’ mechanical philoso-
phy treats the whole world as if it were a collection of machines, 
as he outlines in the Principles of Philosophy: 
 
I have described this earth and indeed the whole 
visible universe as if it were a machine. I have 
considered only the various shapes and move-
ments of its parts.11 
 
I do not recognize any difference between arti-
facts and natural bodies except that the opera-
tions of artifacts are for the most part performed 
by mechanisms which are large enough to be 
easily perceivable by the senses—as indeed 
must be the case if they are to be capable of be-
ing manufactured by human beings. The effects 
produced in nature, by contrast, almost always 
depend on structures which are so minute that 
they completely elude our senses.12 
 
Men who are experienced in dealing with ma-
chinery can take a particular machine whose 
function they know and, by looking at some of 
its parts, easily form a conjecture about the de-
sign of the other parts, which they cannot see. In 
the same way I have attempted to consider the 
observable effects and parts of natural bodies 
and track down the imperceptible causes and 
particles which produce them.13 
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In keeping with his mechanical conceptualization of the world, 
Descartes even goes as far as to claim that the human body is 
“nothing but a statue or machine made of earth, which God 
forms with the explicit intention of making it as much as possible 
like us.”14  Therefore, as mechanics subsume physics, “everything 
in physics now receives a mechanical explanation, that is to say, 
everything is explained as if it were a machine.”15 
Cartesian mechanical philosophy adhered to a form of cor-
puscularism in order to explain the nature of physical objects in 
the world.  This view is closely related to atomism in that it 
claims that all physical objects – indeed, the entire universe – 
were composed of small corpuscles of various sizes, although 
corpuscles were seen as infinitely divisible, rather than being 
theoretically indivisible on the atomic account.  What was unique 
in Descartes’ interpretation of the physical world was that he 
claimed that there could be no void between particles.  Instead, 
Descartes argued that all matter was constantly swirling to pre-
vent a void as corpuscles moved through other matter, thus the 
notion of a “vacuum” was a meaningless term.  Le Monde, or The 
World, presents a corpuscular account of the universe in which 
swirling vortices explain the creation of the solar system and the 
circular motion of planets around the Sun, among other phenom-
ena,.  In The World, Descartes states that  
 
when a body leaves its place, it always enters 
into the place of some other body, and so on to 
the last body…Thus there is no more a vacuum 
between bodies when they are moving about 
than when they are at rest.  And note here that 
in order for this to happen it is not necessary 
that all the parts of bodies moving together 
should be arranged exactly in a ring, as in a true 
circle.16 
 
In light of this view of the physical world, Descartes attempted to 
explain the apparent “force” that causes objects to “fall” towards 
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the center of the earth, obviously referred to as “gravitational 
force” today. Garber highlights the importance of Descartes’ in-
terpretation of gravity as a mechanical process: 
 
If everything in nature is to be explained as if it 
produced effects like a machine, then gravita-
tion cannot simply be assumed; gravitation itself 
must also be explained, and, within the mechani-
cal philosophy, it must be explained mechanisti-
cally.  Or, to put it another way, when mechanics 
subsume physics, we can no longer appeal out-
side of mechanics to some distinct science to 
supply necessary premises concerning heavi-
ness: the premises necessary for doing the tradi-
tional mechanics of heavy bodies must come 
from within the mechanical philosophy itself.17 
 
In keeping with his notions that space is entirely composed of 
various particles, that movement through space is merely a dis-
placement of some particles with others, and that particles are 
interpreted only in terms of size, shape, and motion, Descartes 
claims that objects do not fall towards the earth as a result of any 
gravitational pull.  Instead, he claims that the tendency to fall to-
ward the centre of the earth is a result of an “interaction between 
a body and a vortex of subtle matter that turns around the 
earth…bodies are pushed towards the centre of the earth by col-
liding with the particles of subtle matter in the vortex,”18 and that 
“power which the individual particles of celestial matter have to 
move away from the centre of the earth cannot achieve its effect 
unless, in moving upwards, the particles displace various terres-
trial particles, thus pushing them and driving them down-
wards.”19  His notion of heaviness is summarized as follows: 
 
All the subtle matter which is between here and 
the moon rotates rapidly round the earth, and 
pushes towards it all the bodies which cannot 
move so fast.  It pushes them with greater force 
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when they have not yet begun to fall than when 
they are already falling; for after all, if they are 
falling as fast as it is moving, it will not push 
them at all, and if they are falling faster, it will 
actually resist them.20 
  
Therefore, Descartes’ conceptualization of “gravity” is pro-
vided in terms of size, shape, and motion alone, and fits within 
his general conceptualization of the world as fully consisting of 
various particles.  In light of this, it is unsurprising that the Car-
tesian interpretation of gravity is based solely on the collision 
between a heavy body and the particles of subtle matter.  These 
are mechanical processes, in that they are explained “in terms 
one uses in explaining the behavior of a machine.  In this way the 
(spring-driven) clock or the planetary system…can be explained 
by Descartes strictly in terms of size, shape, and motion of their 
parts.”21 
It should be noted that Newton’s account of the world is also 
widely regarded as one that is based on mechanics.  However, 
what is important is the distinction between the term mechanics 
within the two philosophies.  As mentioned earlier, Descartes’ 
mechanics was a general view of the world as entirely functioning 
as a machine; Newton, on the other hand, viewed the term me-
chanics as it is generally used today – it is the study of motion and 
the forces that change it.  Forces, in Newtonian terms, do not neces-
sarily function in the same way as a machine, and therefore may 
be explained in fundamentally different ways than they can in 
Cartesian terms. 
Newton’s greatest achievement was his theory of gravity, 
from which he was able to explain the motions of all the planets, 
including the moon.  Newton proved that every planet in the so-
lar system at all times accelerates towards the sun, and that the 
acceleration of a body towards the sun is at a rate inversely pro-
portional to the square of its distance from it.  This, of course, led 
to Newton’s law of universal gravitation, by which every particle 
in the universe attracts every other particle in the universe with a 
force that is directly proportional to the product of their masses 
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and that is inversely proportional to the square of the distance 
between them.  Furthermore: 
 
If a body be attracted by another, and its attrac-
tion be vastly stronger when it is contiguous to 
the attracting body than when they are sepa-
rated from one another by a very small interval; 
the forces of the particles of the attracting body 
decrease, in the recess of the body attracted, in 
more than a duplicate ratio of the distance of the 
particles.22 
 
Newton claims that his theory explains:  
 
That all bodies about the earth gravitate towards 
the earth, and that in proportion to the quantity 
of matter which they severally contain; that the 
moon likewise, according to the quantity of its 
matter, gravitates towards the earth…All bodies 
whatsoever are endowed with a principle of 
mutual gravitation.23 
 
What is significant about this discrepancy between the two para-
digms is the specific terminology or lexicon used by each para-
digm in their respective accounts of gravity.  Newton’s explana-
tion of gravity in terms of a quality of a body of mass and an at-
traction between two bodies is fundamentally at odds with a Car-
tesian conception of gravity.  For Descartes, as Garber illustrated, 
when mechanics subsumes physics, we can no longer appeal be-
yond mechanics to some distinct science to supply the necessary 
premises concerning heaviness – the premises necessary for do-
ing the traditional mechanics of heavy bodies must come from 
within the mechanical philosophy itself.  Explaining gravita-
tional force in terms of attraction does not fit within the Cartesian 
paradigm of explaining phenomena solely in terms of size, 
shape, and motion.  As a consequence, Cartesian science simply 
could not accept Newton’s “occult” idea of gravity as being an 
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attractive force innate in bodies of mass.  Considering gravity as a 
universal force operating over empty space inevitably led to a 
problem of how any force could act at a distance.  For a mechani-
cal philosopher like Descartes, nothing could act at a distance.  
Rather, gravity must be talked about only in terms of a mechani-
cal process – namely, as interaction between motion and parti-
cles.  
Newton also claims to have rejected the Cartesian explana-
tion of planetary motion in terms of vortices, arguing that the 
Cartesian conception is missing a fundamental active principle 
that is essential for the perpetual motion of a vortex: 
 
Cor. 4.  …in order to continue a vortex in the 
same state of motion, some active principle is 
required from which the globe may receive con-
tinually the same quantity of motion which it is 
always communicating to the matter of the vor-
tex. Without such a principle it will undoubt-
edly come to pass that the globe and the inward 
parts of the vortex, being always propagating 
their motion to the outward parts, and not re-
ceiving any new motion, will gradually move 
slower and slower, and at last be carried round 
no longer.24 
 
Newton claims that the trajectory of planets is to be explained in 
accordance with the Newtonian conception of gravitational force, 
as opposed to any appeal to vortices (as evident in the Cartesian 
interpretation): 
 
The planets move in ellipses which have their 
common focus in the centre of the sun; and, by 
radii drawn to that centre, they describe areas 
proportional to the times of description.25 
 
That the moon gravitates towards the earth, and 
by the force of gravity is continually drawn off 
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from a rectilinear motion, and retained in its or-
bit.26 
 
For Descartes, the only cause for motion is vortices; to speak of it 
in any other way is to speak in essentially occult terms.   
Within the Cartesian paradigm, there must be something 
physical and sensible between two interacting bodies to influence 
each other.  Newton provides no such evidence: 
 
Hitherto we have explained the phenomena of 
the heavens and of our sea by the power of 
gravity, but have not yet assigned the cause of 
this power… But hitherto I have not been able to 
discover the causes of those properties of grav-
ity from phenomena, and I frame no hypotheses; 
for whatever is not deduced from the phenom-
ena is to be called an hypothesis; and hypothe-
ses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether 
of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place 
in experimental philosophy.27 
 
Newton rejects the Cartesian conception of vortices by instead 
appealing to gravitational force, but offers no cause of gravity – 
merely that gravity is a force that is proportional to the product 
of two masses and inversely proportional to the square of the 
distance between the point masses, and as mentioned earlier, he 
uses such anti-Cartesian terms as “attraction” to explain such a 
relationship.  Indeed, in Newtonian natural philosophy, there is 
an apparent absence of causal hypotheses altogether.   
For Newton, the cause of gravity is an unnecessary part of the 
explanation of how gravity operates.  Instead, Newton literally 
turns the Cartesian methodology (the need for causal hypothe-
ses) on its head – as well as its notion of gravity.  Descartes sees 
“gravity” as a “push” force, while Newton views “gravity” as a 
“pull” or “attraction,” an inherent quality of bodies of mass.  
These terms used within each paradigm, and the respective ap-
proaches to scientific problem-solving are so fundamentally in-
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compatible, so incommensurable, that they resist any forms of 
translation, and thus the debate cannot be resolved by purely 
rational means. 
In addition to rejecting the Cartesian conceptualization of 
planetary motion, Newton also dismissed Galileo's mechanical 
theory of Earth tides in general favor of the Kepler-Gilbert the-
ory, which holds that tides are caused gravitationally, primarily 
by the interaction between the moon and the earth.  Further-
more, Newton also rejected the Cartesian notion that all spaces 
are entirely filled with particles and thus, there can be no void 
between particles: 
 
Cor. 3.  All spaces are not equally full; for if all 
spaces were equally full, then the specific grav-
ity of the fluid which fills the region of the air, 
on the account of the extreme density of the 
matter, would fall nothing short of the specific 
gravity of quicksilver, or gold, or any other of 
the most dense body; and, therefore, neither 
gold, nor any other body, could descend in air; 
for bodies do not descend in fluids, unless they 
are specifically heavier than the fluids.  And if 
the quantity of matter in a given space can, by 
any rarefaction, be diminished, what should 
hinder a diminution to infinity? 
 
Cor. 4.  If all the solid particles of all bodies are 
of the same density, nor can be rarefied without 
pores, a void, space, or vacuum must be 
granted.28 
 
However, if there is indeed a “fundamental conceptual gap” 
between the two paradigms, how is it that Newton seems to be 
able to argue against Cartesian mechanics so intelligibly?  On the 
contrary, although the argument may appear to have established 
a bridge between the two paradigms, when given a closer exami-
nation, it only reinforces the conceptual gap between them.   
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In order to refute the Cartesian conceptualization of “space,” 
and the claim that there can be no vacuum, Newton appeals to 
“density,” a property of a body of matter.  However, in Cartesian 
mechanics, there is no concept of “density.”  Instead, “the nature 
of body consists not in weight, hardness, colour, or the like, but 
simply in extension.”29 For Descartes, matter has no other prop-
erties other than size or three-dimensional extension.  In measur-
ing the quantity of matter, a Cartesian only relies on the meas-
urement of the surface area or volume and the relative amount of 
three different sizes of particles.  Bodies made up of a relatively 
high amount of the smallest particles are less solid, while those 
with a relatively high amount of the largest particles are more 
solid.  For a Newtonian, quantity of matter is “mass,” a calcula-
tion of density and volume; for a Cartesian, the notion of “mass” is 
spatial extension, and nothing more.  The “density” of particles in 
a body of matter has no place in the equation; indeed, “density” 
has no place in Cartesian mechanics.  For Newton, mass is not 
extension, yet extension is the only inherent property of matter 
for Descartes.  As a consequence, the Newtonian concepts of 
“mass” and “density” are simply incomprehensible to a Carte-
sian.  Thus, although it appears as though Newton argues 
against the Cartesian claim that there can be no vacuum in space, 
it is only through the use of terms that are fundamentally unin-
telligible to the Cartesian.  Newton makes no attempt to refute 
Cartesian mechanical philosophy using terminology within the 
Cartesian paradigm, only that which is conceptually outside of it, 
which dissolves any grounds for rational, intelligible argument. 
What was particularly significant about Descartes’ program 
was that he set out to provide an account of natural phenomena 
through reason: in an a priori, deductive, synthetic methodology, 
rather than purely through examination of empirical evidence.  
Although there is a great deal of debate over the role of experi-
ence and non-mathematical evidence in Descartes’ natural phi-
losophy, what seems to be clear is that Descartes held a priori rea-
soning, based on first causes or principles of nature established 
through geometry or mathematics, to be paramount in scientific 
inquiry.  As Sakellariadis demonstrates, Descartes was particu-
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larly dismissive of empirical evidence presented to him by his 
contemporaries that served to counter his own theories: 
 
The burden of Descartes’ [letter to Mersenne of 
18 December 1629] suggests that Mersenne sent 
him some data that seemed to refute his the-
ory…Referring to the measured acceleration of 
the pendulum bob, [Descartes] wrote: “As for 
the magnitude, I ignore it.  And even if he can 
make a thousand experiments to find it more 
accurately, I do not have to take the trouble to 
do them myself, if they cannot be explained by 
reason.”  No matter how clearly the results of 
Beeckman’s and Mersenne’s observations dif-
fered from the predictions of Descartes’ princi-
ples, no matter how accurate or reliable the re-
sults, Descartes claimed that he was not con-
strained to consider them…unless the results 
could be adequately explained by another, more 
logical theory.30 
 
Therefore, by and large, Descartes sees proper scientific theories 
as being derivable through a priori reasoning, and consequently 
to be held no matter what empirical evidence served to counter 
them.  In Kuhnian terms, Descartes has become entrenched 
within a certain way of seeing things, in that he tends to see only 
that which he expects to see.  Only results which tend to 
strengthen the current paradigm get accepted during this period 
of “Cartesian normal science.”  Indeed, it would seem as though 
such rigidity may have served to cloud Descartes’ vision.   
On the other hand, a scientific hypothesis or theory that relies 
primarily on empirical evidence is, on the Cartesian paradigm, 
simply an inadequate one.  However, within the Newtonian 
paradigm, even the approach to natural philosophy is fundamen-
tally distinct from that of the Cartesian.  As Newton proclaimed 
during his Presidency at the Royal Society, the Newtonian  
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program was to reinstate the significance of empirical evidence 
in scientific inquiry: 
 
Natural Philosophy consists in discovering the 
frame and operations of Nature, and reducing 
them, as far as they may be, to general Rules 
or Laws – establishing these rules by observa-
tions and experiments, and thence deducing 
the causes and effects of things.31 
 
Newton’s empirical method claimed to provide the proper de-
scription of the relevant natural phenomenon and, in light of that 
description, provide general principles that account for such phe-
nomena.  No a priori reasoning is necessary to account for natural 
phenomena.  Indeed, the Newtonian empirical method was in-
tended to “loosen what Newton took to be the pernicious grip of 
Cartesian notions within natural philosophy.”32 For Descartes, 
empirical evidence alone can neither confirm nor disconfirm hy-
potheses; for Newton, they are essential for both.  Clearly, the 
two paradigms have distinctly incompatible criteria for what 
counts as an adequately solved scientific problem.   
To reiterate, according to the mechanistic scientific program, 
all natural phenomena must be explained in terms of size, shape, 
and motion.  As a result, a scientist working within this para-
digm must explain all natural phenomena, such as planetary mo-
tion or trajectories and gravitational force, in terms of various 
collisions between small bodies making up the larger bodies of 
everyday experience.  The idea that things operate only through 
the size, shape, and motion of their parts is not intelligible to the 
Newtonian as it is to the Cartesian.  Within the Newtonian para-
digm, such mechanical explanations are misplaced, and are en-
tirely unnecessary.   Instead, as in the case of gravitational force, 
one explains such natural phenomena in terms of an attractive 
force between each body in the universe.  There exists a signifi-
cant incompatibility between the Cartesian and Newtonian con-
ceptions of both “matter” and “space.”  The foundation of Carte-
sian physics relies on the denial of the existence of vacuums or 
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voids between or within particles.  On the Newtonian concep-
tion, such denial does not exist; indeed, it is viewed as entirely 
erroneous.  When a Cartesian talks of “space,” his conceptualiza-
tion is so fundamentally opposed to that of the Newtonian para-
digm that it defies accurate comparison.  “Space” for a Cartesian 
simply is not “space” for a Newtonian – the same goes for 
“matter,” “gravity,” and “planetary motion.”  Thus there are se-
rious difficulties in directly comparing or translating these com-
peting conceptions; in other words, these terms are fundamen-
tally incommensurable.  
The consequences of such a fundamental conceptual gap is 
great, as it is indicative of how the Newtonian system did not 
build upon the ideas of the Cartesians, but rather reinvented the 
nature of science itself – both the explanatory power of science 
and its limits.  There was no clear progression or improvement 
from Cartesianism to Newtonianism. Instead, the Cartesian para-
digm was quite suddenly discarded by scientists and replaced by 
the Newtonian worldview: 
 
[W]hile the standards of corpuscularism re-
mained in effect, the search for a mechanical ex-
planation of gravity was one of the most chal-
lenging problems for those who accepted the 
Principia as paradigm…Unable either to practice 
science without the Principia or to make that 
work conform to the corpuscular standards of 
the seventeenth century, scientists gradually ac-
cepted the view that gravity was indeed innate.  
By the mid-eighteenth century that interpreta-
tion had been almost universally accepted, and 
the result was a genuine reversion…Innate at-
tractions and repulsions joined size, shape, posi-
tion, and motion as physically irreducible pri-
mary properties of matter.33 
 
Due to these fundamental gaps between the two worldviews, 
the remaining supporters of the Cartesian paradigm were unable 
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(though, in many cases, they were quite unwilling) to change 
their own worldview and adopt the Newtonian program, and 
thus became increasingly marginalized by the scientific commu-
nity.  The Cartesian paradigm, rather than being acknowledged 
as deficient and accordingly improved upon, eventually died out 
with the last of its supporters.  Just as Kuhn claimed, the debate 
between the two camps was not resolved by purely rational 
means such as deliberation or subtle adjustments in light of new 
findings.  It was, rather, a relatively sudden switch creating a 
new, widely held, distinctly Newtonian worldview.   
digms.  However, this is clearly not the case when analyzing the 
Cartesian and Newtonian paradigms.  As a consequence of op-
posing standards for what counts as an adequately explained 
scientific quandary, as well as a fundamental conceptual gap be-
tween the two systems, there is no such intelligible link between 
the Cartesian and Newtonian paradigms, which in turn provides 
clear support for the Kuhnian theory of the nature of scientific 
revolutions.  
 
 
NOTES 
 
1 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 3rd Edition. Chi-
cago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996. 
2 Ibid., 109. 
3 Ibid., 24. 
4 Ibid., 85. 
5 Ibid., 122. 
6 Ibid., 79. 
7 Ibid., 117. 
8 Ibid., 129. 
9 The shift from Aristotelianism to Cartesian mechanics is exam-
ined in Daniel Garber’s “Descartes and the Scientific Revolution: 
Some Kuhnian Reflections.”  Garber illustrates that “there could 
scarcely be a more paradigmatic instance of a Kuhnian scientific 
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As Garber has shown, it may be inappropriate to deny the 
intelligible link between the Aristotelian and Cartesian para-
revolution than this, the transition between one scientific para-
digm and another.”  However, it should be noted that Garber 
argues that the Kuhnian model of incommensurability between 
two paradigms may not apply in this particular case.  Garber 
claims that there is no such conceptual gap between the two 
paradigms, as the notion of a machine was as “fully compatible 
on the Aristotelian paradigm as it was on the Cartesian.”  Never-
theless, as it will be shown, a Cartesian-Newtonian paradigm 
analysis is indeed supportive of Kuhn’s model. 
10 Garber, “Descartes and the Scientific Revolution: Some 
Kuhnian Reflections,” 408. 
11 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. I, Pr IV 
188. 
12 Ibid., Pr IV 203. 
13 Ibid., Pr IV 203. 
14 Descartes, Oeuvres de Descartes, vol. XI, 99. 
15 Garber, “Descartes, Mechanics, and the Mechanical Philoso-
phy,” 192. 
16 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. I, 86. 
17 Garber, “Descartes, Mechanics, and the Mechanical Philoso-
phy,” 193. 
18 Ibid., 195. 
19 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. I, Pr IV 23. 
20 Ibid., vol. III, 135. 
21 Garber, “Descartes, Mechanics, and the Mechanical Philoso-
phy,” 198. 
22 Newton, The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, 173 
23 Ibid., 325. 
24 Ibid., 314. 
25 Ibid., 342. 
26 Ibid., 331. 
27 Ibid., 446. 
28 Ibid., 336. 
29 Descartes. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. I, Pr II 4. 
30 Sakellariadis, “Descartes’s Use of Empirical Evidence to Test 
Hypotheses,” 69. 
31 Newton, Philosophical Writings, ix. 
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32 Ibid., xii. 
33 Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 105-106.  
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